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NO. 3 JANUARY 2019 Introduction 
Non-euro Countries in the EU 
after Brexit 
Between Fear of Losing of Political Influence and Euro Accession 
Paweł Tokarski and Serafina Funk 
Despite the United Kingdom never having adopted the euro, the upcoming Brexit will 
have consequences not only for the European Union as a whole but also for monetary 
integration. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will heighten fears among the ‘euro-
outs’, the eight Member States that have not adopted the euro, that their influence 
over the Union’s decision-making processes will diminish in the future. Their concern 
has led to the formation of a new coalition of states uniting the interests of the north-
ern euro members and some countries outside the eurozone. Although the debate 
over enlarging the eurozone is now subsiding, the ‘Brexit moment’ could trigger a 
new dynamic and act as a driver for expanding the eurozone or strengthening some 
non-euro states’ links to the banking union. 
 
The eight euro-outs (Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Croatia, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary) are a hetero-
geneous group of countries that follow very 
different economic models and are at dif-
ferent stages of economic development. For 
example, Denmark’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita is seven times higher 
than that of Bulgaria. There is also a con-
siderable gap in the competitiveness of the 
non-euro states. According to the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2018, Sweden and 
Denmark are among the most competitive 
countries in the world. They occupy the 
ninth and tenth places in the ranking. The 
other non-euro states, which are currently 
plagued by political instability and insti-
tutional weaknesses, still base their com-
petitiveness on low wages. The size and 
importance of their financial sectors to 
their economies also vary widely within 
the group. The share of banking sector 
assets to GDP is three times higher in Den-
mark than it is in Poland. Central and 
Eastern European countries faced immense 
challenges during the global financial crisis 
as their banking sectors were largely owned 
by foreign banking groups. This meant that 
national banking authorities were only able 
to perform their supervisory tasks to a lim-
ited extent. All these differences mean that 
non-euro countries have quite different 
priorities when it comes to EU legislation 
in the field of financial regulation. 
The dynamics of economic growth in 
these euro-out countries are affected by 
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their different stages of economic develop-
ment. The less developed among them 
often achieve higher growth rates due to 
the catch-up effect. With the exception of 
Sweden and Denmark, whose economic 
growth in 2017 was slightly below the euro 
area average of 2.4 percent, the economies 
of those EU Member States outside the euro 
area that are less economically developed 
grew much faster. 
The individual relationships of the euro-
outs to the euro and the eurozone are also 
very different. Most of them pursue inde-
pendent monetary policies. Denmark has 
been a member of the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism 2 (ERM 2) since 1999 and conducts a 
fixed exchange rate policy against the euro. 
Before that, from 1982, the Danish krone 
was pegged to the deutschmark. After 
Brexit, Denmark will be the only state with 
an opt-out clause from the third stage of 
the Economic and Monetary Union. All 
other EU countries are contractually obliged 
to adopt the euro as soon as they meet the 
convergence criteria. In the case of Den-
mark, the op-out clause was agreed after 
a referendum in 1992 failed to secure a ma-
jority in favour of ratifying the Maastricht 
Treaty and the introduction of the euro was 
rejected in another referendum in 2000. 
The Bulgarian lev is pegged to the euro 
at a fixed rate as part of a currency board 
arrangement. Romania and Croatia main-
tain exchange rate regimes with a managed 
floating exchange rate against the euro. 
Croatia’s relationship to the single currency 
is very special. The country’s economy is 
largely ‘euroised’. Around 75 percent of 
assets and 67 percent of liabilities are de-
nominated in euros. 
All countries in the group are open 
economies interested in deepening the 
single market. Furthermore, they are all in 
favour of the euro area being open to new 
members. At the same time, they support 
euro area integrity, even though they are 
unwilling to bear the necessary stabilisation 
costs. The economic diversity of the non-
euro countries and their different relation-
ships to the euro and the euro area make 
it difficult for the euro-outs to cooperate 
politically with one another within the EU. 
This increases their risk of losing influence 
within the Union after Brexit. 
Superior numbers of eurozone 
members in the EU 
For the euro-outs, the UK’s withdrawal 
represents a political power shift within 
the EU. The exit from the EU of one of the 
largest member countries will also mean 
the departure of a major non-euro state 
from European decision-making processes. 
For some states and groups of states, this 
will increase their voting power in the Coun-
cil of the European Union. This fundamen-
tal change will be due to the disappearance 
of around 13 percent of the total popula-
tion of the EU. Around 80 percent of the 
legislation that the Council has to ratify 
is subject to a system of double qualified 
majority voting. Accordingly, in order for a 
bill to be adopted, it requires the support of 
at least 55 percent of Council members who 
must also represent at least 65 percent of 
the EU’s citizens. The removal of the UK 
and its population from the double quali-
fied majority calculation will increase the 
population share of eurozone members 
compared to the EU as a whole. After Brexit, 
the EU-19 will represent 70.4 percent of 
Member States and 76.5 percent of the total 
EU population (see figure). The ‘blocking 
minority’, which can block a bill that has 
to be passed by a double qualified majority, 
will be more difficult for the euro-outs to 
achieve. Article 238(3)a TFEU stipulates that 
a coalition of four states together represent-
ing at least 35 percent of the EU population 
may reject a bill. It was already very com-
plicated to achieve this blocking minority 
before Brexit; after Brexit, it is likely to be 
impossible to overrule a united eurozone 
in the Council. 
The impact of the superior numbers of 
euro area countries on voting procedures 
in the Council will be limited if the body 
maintains its tendency to take decisions by 
consensus. Brexit will be less significant in 
those areas of the single market where 
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Council decisions can only be taken unani-
mously (e.g., EU Multiannual Financial 
Framework or social security and social pro-
tection legislation). However, the expected 
predominance of the EU-19 over other 
Member States due to their superior num-
bers reinforces concerns about a reduction 
in their influence on decision-making in 
the European Union. 
Although there is currently little poten-
tial for conflicts of interest between the EU-
19 and the EU-8, further integration, par-
ticularly in the field of financial markets, 
may lead to increasing dissent. The conflicts 
between the euro-ins and the euro-outs do 
occur, as demonstrated during the discus-
sions on the creation of banking union in 
2012. The UK, in particular, feared that the 
interests of the EU-19 would prevail at the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), which 
is responsible for setting common super-
visory standards in the banking sector of 
the single market. Under pressure from 
London, a special voting system was there-
fore agreed for the EBA: a decision by 
the Board of Supervisors requires a double 
simple majority of EU states inside and 
outside the euro area. The UK’s exit from 
the EU is, therefore, likely to weaken the 
EU-8’s negotiating position inside the EBA. 
Moreover, the double majority system in 
the EBA will no longer be used once at 
least four of the euro-outs participate in the 
banking union’s Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism (SSM). 
However, the UK’s strength in the EU 
has not only been formally reflected in the 
weighting of its vote in legislative processes, 
but has also made itself felt at an informal 
level. The UK has used many channels to 
safeguard its economic and political inter-
ests in the EU. It has always had a strong 
influence on single market legislation, for 
example, by ensuring that UK experts filled 
relevant key positions in EU institutions. In 
addition, London has strongly supported 
the deepening of the single market in ser-
vices, digitisation and energy, an attitude 
that was in line with that of all EU mem-
bers outside the euro, in particular the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries. Then 
again, criticism of one of the foundations 
of the single market, namely the free move-
ment of people, especially from new Mem-
ber States, was a key issue in the Brexit 
debate in the UK. 
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The UK’s exit from the EU may have 
other consequences. It might strengthen 
the Franco-German duo. Such a develop-
ment could be a problem for certain smaller 
states, as the major euro countries already 
have a greater impact on decision-making 
and agenda-setting with their representa-
tives filling key EU positions. 
Euro-outs and EU coalitions 
The shift in voting rights in the overall 
structure of the EU Council will not affect 
dynamics among the euro-ins. Whether the 
superior number of eurozone countries pre-
dominance in the Council leads to them 
dominating the EU’s legislative and agenda-
setting processes will depend very much on 
how united the euro countries are in de-
fending their interests. Although members 
of the monetary union are closely linked in 
many respects, their positions and weight 
in European politics vary widely. 
Different divisions can be identified in 
groups of states within the eurozone. One 
camp includes those countries that focus on 
making budgetary policy more flexible, on 
risk sharing and on more fiscal transfers in 
the euro area. This group mainly includes 
the southern members of the euro area, 
such as France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portu-
gal, Cyprus and Malta. Representatives of 
these countries meet regularly at informal 
Southern EU Summits. 
Then there is the group of states whose 
economic policy is primarily based on in-
dividual responsibility for economic poli-
cies and who insist on compliance with 
fiscal rules. Germany, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Austria and a few other countries 
such as Slovakia and the Baltic countries 
are in this camp. These groups have been 
focusing their political efforts on maintain-
ing budgetary discipline, reducing risk, 
stricter implementation of rules and pro-
moting structural reforms. The two camps 
hold opposing views on the future direction 
of eurozone reforms. 
At the end of 2017, at the initiative of 
the Netherlands and Ireland, some coun-
tries in the second group met in a new 
format. The alliance consisted of eight 
countries and included the euro states 
Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands and the two euro-outs Den-
mark and Sweden. It later named itself the 
New Hanseatic League and in a statement 
on 6 March 2018 declared it was in favour 
of maintaining monetary union as an in-
clusive format that was also open to non-
euro states. The group stands for compli-
ance with the common rules and economic 
self-responsibility among eurozone mem-
bers. The banking union project should be 
fully implemented, provided there is suf-
ficient risk reduction in the banking sector, 
and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) strengthened and expanded to a Euro-
pean Monetary Fund. However, this insti-
tution should retain its intergovernmental 
character. The new alliance, which is be-
coming increasingly formalised, could take 
effect at Council level, not only attempting 
to block proposals from other euro states, 
but also working towards curbing Franco-
German dominance. In June 2018, the 
Netherlands, an informal spokesman for 
the group, protested against the Franco-
German proposal to set up a separate euro-
zone budget. 
Deepening the single market and, in 
particular, further integrating the capital 
markets (Capital Markets Union, CMU) is 
another important objective of the New 
Hanseatic League. The initiative to create a 
Capital Markets Union was launched by the 
European Commission in 2015. The pur-
pose of the CMU is to address the lack of 
diversified sources of capital in the finan-
cial sector which leads to overdependence 
on the banking sector. Brexit will make it 
more difficult to implement the Capital 
Markets Union project since the main spon-
sor of this project, the UK, which also has 
the most developed financial market in the 
EU, will be missing. In a joint declaration 
from July 2018, the eight members of the 
New Hanseatic League pledged to continue 
implementing the Capital Markets Union. 
On 2 November, the finance ministers of 
the new cooperation alliance, which now 
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comprises ten countries following the acces-
sion of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
made a statement about the ESM reforms. 
In it, they reaffirmed the importance of 
ESM reforms for the EU as a whole, stress-
ing the need to keep the banking union 
open to non-euro countries. 
The Hanseatic Group is an example of 
how successful joint representation of euro-
ins and euro-outs can be on the issue of 
eurozone reforms. The fact that only two 
Visegrád countries are members of the co-
operation raises doubts about the ability of 
Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary to jointly pursue their objectives 
on euro area reform. The Visegrád Group 
(V4) was able to defend its interests quite 
well in negotiations on the current EU Multi-
annual Financial Framework 2014–2020. 
Although the increased integration of the 
euro area may lead to fragmentation of the 
single market, the V4 appear neither to be 
united nor interested in the current debate 
on Economic and Monetary Union. Euro-
zone reforms are only a marginal topic at 
V4 meetings. The capability of other non-
euro states such as Bulgaria, Romania and 
Croatia to form alliances is negligible due 
to their low shares of EU-27 population and 
economic weakness. 
From euro-outs to euro-ins? 
The UK’s departure from the EU throws up 
questions as to how the balance of power 
in a post-Brexit Union and the further inte-
gration of the euro area might affect the 
propensity of non-euro states to adopt the 
single currency. The first step is to deter-
mine whether Brexit will influence the con-
figuration of the eurozone and accelerate 
its enlargement. 
During the euro crisis, the UK govern-
ment’s positions on many issues made crisis 
management more difficult. Although it 
granted Ireland a bilateral loan in 2011, it 
rejected any further use of the EFSM which 
used the EU budget as collateral for bailout 
packages. London also opposed adoption of 
the European Fiscal Pact which was there-
fore concluded outside the EU legal frame-
work. However, the UK’s exit from the EU 
will not make the implementation of euro-
zone reforms any easier because of the 
enormous number of conflicting interests 
among the EU-19. 
However, Brexit will make it easier for 
euro area members to make exclusive use 
of instruments designed for the EU as a 
whole. The exit of the largest non-euro state 
and one of the largest net contributors to 
the EU budget will allow the EU-19 to use 
some budget lines for sole purposes. After 
Brexit, the only euro outs that are net con-
tributors to the EU budget will be Sweden 
and Denmark. With the UK gone, there will 
also be a statistical shift in wealth within 
the EU. The new EU Member States will be 
statistically richer, which could lead them 
to facing lower financial flows from the EU 
budget and, in particular, from Cohesion 
Policy allocations. In turn, this could lead 
to EU budget transfers being redirected to 
southern eurozone members. 
Other major reform projects in the euro-
zone include completing the banking union 
and expanding the tasks of the ESM. These 
projects are important for stabilising the 
eurozone and increasing its resilience to 
crises. Contrary to non-euro countries’ fears, 
they do not risk forming a “Hard-core” 
Europe. The banking union was initiated in 
2012. While the measures associated with 
it are primarily aimed at the euro states, for 
whom membership is mandatory, partici-
pation in the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
of the banking union is also possible for non-
euro countries. However, SSM members 
outside the euro area do not have access to 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
ESM facilities. The influence of a euro-out 
state on the decision-making process in 
the banking union is also very limited. Most 
EU countries outside the euro area will, 
therefore, have a rather cautious approach 
towards the banking union. On the other 
hand, after exposing corruption scandals 
at the Slovenian and Latvian central banks, 
the ECB and some members of the euro-
zone are very reluctant to admit new Mem-
ber States with weak national institutions. 
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The recent case of massive money laun-
dering at Danske Bank shows that banking 
supervision needs to be strengthened and 
more centralised, not only in the euro area 
but throughout the single market as a whole. 
This could intensify pressure on Copen-
hagen to join the SSM. Sweden, whose 
banking sector is dominant in the Baltic 
States, should also be encouraged to join 
the SSM for the same reasons. 
Although all EU countries, except Den-
mark and the UK, have a legal obligation 
to participate in the monetary union, this 
obligation is not linked to any timetable. 
It has also never been an object of political 
pressure. The most likely candidates to in-
troduce the euro are the EU’s three poorest 
countries: Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. 
Theoretically, Bulgaria currently meets 
almost all convergence criteria, but the 
country’s structural problems, corruption 
and weak institutions are standing in the 
way of Sofia’s path to membership. There 
is also an urgent need for measures to im-
prove the institutional environments and 
economic conditions in Romania and Croa-
tia. Croatia currently has the most difficult 
economic situation. It is battling excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances and facing a 
high public debt to GDP ratio (78 percent 
in 2017). Private and public debt, which is 
largely held in foreign currencies, remains 
a source of vulnerability for the Croatian 
economy. 
An important factor in adopting the euro 
is public support for the single currency. 
According to Eurobarometer surveys con-
ducted in May 2018, the majority of respon-
dents in Romania (69 percent), Hungary 
(59 percent) and Bulgaria (51 percent) sup-
port the introduction of the euro. In Po-
land, 48 percent are in favour and in Croa-
tia the figure is 47 percent. Sweden (40 per-
cent) and the Czech Republic (33 percent) 
are the least willing to adopt the euro. 
These sentiments influence the policy strat-
egies of the euro-outs. In Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, the national cur-
rency is considered a symbol of state inde-
pendence. It is, therefore, unlikely that 
Prague and Warsaw will accede to the euro-
zone. Budapest, on the other hand, is keep-
ing this question open. 
Outlook: consequences and 
recommendations 
To date, knowledge of the upcoming Brexit 
has not significantly changed the euro-
adoption plans of the euro-outs. However, 
the new realities of life in the EU after 
Brexit are likely to persuade these countries 
to revise their cost-benefit calculations for 
joining the euro, or at least to have closer 
links with the euro area. All the euro-outs 
are already becoming concerned about 
losing influence over EU decision-making 
after Brexit. These concerns are not only 
due to the lack of an effective blocking mi-
nority but also due to the inability of non-
euro states, with their differing interests, to 
act as a coherent group in the EU. The euro-
outs are not subject to the same degree of 
risk from marginalisation: Sweden, Den-
mark and the Czech Republic are in a better 
position to articulate their interests through 
the New Hanseatic League. On the other 
hand, there are countries like Poland, 
whose isolation in EU politics is mostly due 
to domestic developments and which is 
likely deepen further as a result of Brexit. 
The first test of the political weight of 
the euro-outs will be who fills which key 
positions at the EU institutions after the 
European parliamentary elections in May 
2019. These important functions include 
the President of the European Council and 
Euro Summit, certain portfolios in the Euro-
pean Commission and cabinet member 
posts. The appointment of some candidates 
from eurozone countries such as Slovakia, 
Slovenia or the Baltic States to key EU posi-
tions could convey the message that the po-
litical and financial risk of joining the euro 
is one worth taking. However, the main 
obstacle to pushing through this idea is the 
relatively small number of experienced 
politicians in the new Member States who 
would be suitable for these posts. 
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU could 
be used to build up new momentum among 
 SWP Comment 3 
 January 2019 
 7 
non-euro countries to adopt the euro. This 
could encourage the countries concerned 
to strengthen their links with the euro area 
by participating in the SSM. Both Berlin 
and Brussels should support this dynamic. 
More generous financial support for those 
countries about to adopt the euro would 
strengthen the institutional convergence of 
the euro-outs with the EU-19. It is essential 
to further promote the creation of a con-
vergence facility within the EU Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2021-2027, an instru-
ment proposed by the Commission to pro-
vide targeted support to Member States 
wishing to adopt the euro. This facility 
must be substantial enough to tackle huge 
structural challenges in the most likely 
euro candidate countries (Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Croatia). It is questionable whether the 
2.16 billion euros currently proposed for 
the seven-year financial framework will be 
sufficient to force structural changes and 
act as an incentive. 
In addition, the European Commission 
should also articulate more clearly the ad-
vantages of membership of the eurozone 
compared to the risks. Belonging to the 
euro area can increase financial stability, 
reduce financing costs and provide access 
to the ECB and ESM facilities. Full partici-
pation in the SSM would be particularly 
advantageous to those euro-outs whose 
banking sectors are dominated by foreign 
ownership (Croatia, Romania and the Czech 
Republic). 
The Franco-German tandem could emerge 
stronger from Brexit because of the power 
gained by Berlin and Paris. However, there 
are doubts as to whether both countries 
will be able to make effective use of this 
potentially more influential position against 
a backdrop of growing domestic challenges 
and the ongoing reform process in the euro-
zone. 
The fear of euro-outs being marginalised 
could jeopardise new integration projects 
in the euro area. The group of ten northern 
states has been mistrustful of Franco-Ger-
man proposals on further eurozone reforms. 
Further initiatives on deeper economic in-
tegration must ensure they do not exclude 
smaller EU Member States. Germany should, 
therefore, intensify its political contacts 
with countries in this group, in particular 
Denmark and Sweden, and encourage them 
to forge closer links to the economic gov-
ernance of the euro area by participating 
in the SSM. 
Further eurozone enlargement is in the 
interests of both Germany and the EU. This 
could reduce both the problems associated 
with the dual nature of economic govern-
ance in the EU and the risk of fragmenta-
tion of the internal market, which is a fac-
tor in the further development of the bank-
ing union. However, the most important 
condition for further accessions to the euro 
is the lasting stabilisation of the eurozone 
itself. Nevertheless, the remaining question 
concerning fiscal stability in Italy does not 
currently offer favourable conditions for a 
discussion on reforms and enlargement of 
the euro area (see SWP-Aktuell 52/2018). 
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